ILRF

Revue internationale du Travail

0378-5599 1564-9121

10.1111/ilrf.12278

Qui veut (dé)réglementer le travail dans les pays en développement? La théorie des insiders‐outsiders en question

RONCONI

Lucas

ronconilucas@gmail.com KANBUR

Ravi

sk145@cornell.edu LÓPEZ‐CARIBONI

Santiago

santiago.lopez@cienciassociales.edu.uy

Université de Buenos Aires, Partnership for Economic Policy (PEP) et Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) Université Cornell, États‐Unis Université de la République, Uruguay

02 06 2023

162 2

10.1111/ilrf.v162.2

247 270

Selon l'approche «insiders‐outsiders», qui domine le discours sur le droit du travail, la législation protectrice de l'emploi favorise les travailleurs dotés d'un emploi stable, les insiders, au détriment des outsiders, moins bien lotis. Les outsiders devraient de ce fait être favorables à la déréglementation. Les auteurs observent pourtant que, dans les pays en développement, ceux‐ci sont au contraire très majoritairement attachés à la protection de l'emploi. Ils plaident donc pour une remise en question de l'opposition traditionnelle entre insiders et outsiders et pour une meilleure prise en compte d'aspects comme la mutualisation des gains, les transitions professionnelles, l'équité ou le pouvoir de l'employeur.

Mots‐clésmarchés du travail droit du travail théorie néoclassique pays en développement équité efficience

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