Abstract
In this paper I want to show in what sense Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is an ethics and in what senses ethical and philosophical problems involve repression. However, there is a reason why it is not so easy to see how ethics and repression enter Wittgenstein’s thinking. This is because what in my view gives Wittgenstein’s remarks their illuminating power is not directly stated by him; probably he did not think explicitly of it. I try to show that this source of clarity is something I call the I-you perspective. Throughout his later philosophy Wittgenstein refuses to argue for or against general, metaphysical claims. Instead, he invites his reader to abandon the perspective where the metaphysical dichotomies “force” themselves on us. One could say that his general strategy is to invite the reader to imagine what it would mean to utter the claims under consideration to a particular person; to a “you”. – The I-you perspective is central also to Freud even if he does not recognise this. Elaborating this perspective will show what the affinities between Freud and Wittgenstein are, in what sense ethics is fundamental in a non-metaphysical way, and why it is important to view philosophical and ethical problems as instances of repression.
Keywords:
- Keyword: Ethics
- Keyword: I-you perspective
- Keyword: meaning
- Keyword: Philosophical problem
- Keyword: repression
How to Cite:
Nykänen, H., (2014) “Wittgenstein and Psychoanalysis: Freud’s Dangerous Pupil”, The European Journal of Psychoanalysis 1(2), 1–16.
Rights: Incopyright
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