Oscar Wilde once wrote: ‘Ideals are dangerous things. Realities are better. They wound, but they’re better’ (2003, p. 461). While Wilde could eloquently encapsulate the dilemma of ideals in his unique manner, certain enigmas persist. If ideals are deemed so perilous, why do they remain so crucial to society? Moreover, if there exists a relationship between realities and ideals, why should we lay blame on realities for the wounds, rather than on ideals? Despite the perception that ideals pose a threat to society, they continue to hold significance. Upon closer examination of this phenomenon, we must acknowledge that something has evolved. In both clinical and general societal contexts, we encounter a transformation in the concept of ideals. Initially, we can define an ideal as an idea of perfection, serving as a model for the subject. The ideal simultaneously exists both within and outside the subject, encompassing subjective and objective aspects. When confronted by others, the ideal can evolve into a norm. In a non-descriptive sense, a norm represents a social concept of “should-being.” This understanding of a norm incorporates elements of ideals. In contrast, the law represents a social concept of “should-not-being.” In my essay, I will follow Foucault’s (1978) thesis that, in Western society, the role of norms is increasingly important compared to the validity of the law. The main idea of this article is to explore the ramifications of this claim on psychoanalysis. Consequently, the position and function of ideals have undergone fundamental changes. This thesis has a significant impact on the meta-psychological concept of symptom formation. Various theoretical frameworks have been employed to describe this shift, but I will argue within the context of a Lacanian-inspired theory of a “post-Oedipal society” (Soiland, 2022). In this context, “post-Oedipal” signifies a stage where the authority of the law of the father, the symbolic Other, diminishes or erodes. A key premise of my argument is that psychoanalysis makes a valuable contribution to explaining how the modern subject is constituted and positioned within society. From a Lacanian perspective, this subject, in relation to the other/Other, establishes two distinct positions: the imaginary ideal ego and the symbolic ego ideal (Lacan, 2006b). While the ideal ego tends to establish norms, the ego ideal is used to subject the individual to the law. Both of these elements coexist in society, but in the post-Oedipal, capitalistic society, there is a tendency to prioritize norms over the law. It is evident that these transformations have a wide range of implications for psychoanalysis, both in its clinical applications and metapsychology. To illustrate this issue, it is useful to examine the crucial role of the psychoanalytic setting, particularly the practice of free association. Some patients can only perceive free association as a norm. Their egos are preoccupied with striving to achieve this status. They seek assurance that they have met the norm, but paradoxically, this perspective, this ego-performance, hinders their ability to truly embrace this status. In this example, the ideal exhibits a highly contradictory character. On one hand, it may aid in complying with the rules of the setting, but on the other, the form of the ideal appears to obstruct the path to genuine free association. The contradictory relationship between norms and laws is not limited to free association but extends to other aspects of the psychoanalytic setting as well. For instance, the rule regarding session cancellations can be challenging for some patients to accept. They may feel constrained in their so-called free decisions, and sometimes this frustration can manifest as aggression in the process. The “cancellation policy” is often perceived as an unreasonable demand that restricts the patient's freedom to decide. It seems that the prohibitive nature of this aspect of the setting can trigger such reactions. Taking these technical aspects into account, I contend that psychoanalysis should adhere to the symbolic framework of the law. I will argue that the emancipation and realization of the subject in the psychoanalytical process can only occur within a dialectical interplay of master and slave. In an Oedipal framework, the concept of emancipation describes a process of liberation from the restriction of law, dependencies, and similar limitations. However, the transition to a post-Oedipal perspective necessitates a re- evaluation of the notion of emancipation. Hence, it becomes imperative to heed Butler's (1997) insights on subjectivation. In this context, emancipation becomes intricately intertwined with the dynamics of subordination. In the Oedipal society, the subordination of the subject remained repressed in the unconscious, simultaneously supporting both the illusion of the subject's autonomy and its emancipation. In the post-Oedipal society, however, this subordination itself is denied, leading to a confusion in the constitution of the subject, the unconscious, and also the liberation of the subject from external dependencies. Paradoxically, emancipation in this sense could entail puncturing the denial, thereby partially acknowledging dependence and subordination. My argumentation will proceed through the following steps:
  1. As a first step, I want to take a look at the concept of ideal and the inherent contradiction between perfection and imperfection. This will lead us to the differentiation of an ideal, which belongs to an imaginary register and one that belongs to a symbolic
  2. In the next phase, I will consider Foucault’s thesis, which posits that contemporary society has transitioned from a society of sovereignty to a society of norms. In other words, we can characterize this state, this societal precondition, as a post-Oedipal dispositif. Following this line of reasoning, psychoanalysis must adapt its conception of symptoms and its understanding of neurotic conflicts. This adaptation might be a primary reason why psychoanalysis is currently facing a situation akin to a “philosophical restoration”(Derrida, 1990, p. 4).
  3. The next step in the argumentation will be, that the law and norms are different answers to the question that emerges in the relationship between the subject and its Norms and law are combined with the problem of the different levels of the imaginary and symbolic order. I will shortly present some positions, which can be described as a kind of logic, and which derives from the concept of symbolic castration.
  4. In the following step, I will delve into not only the positions but also the dynamics and the implicit dialectic. We will explore how this dialectic connects with Hegel's dialectic of master and slave. Freud's concept of the ideal and his cultural-critical studies provide insights into some of these These concepts can aid us in comprehending the challenges inherent in establishing a law that should be collectively accepted. Several avenues will guide us to a unique understanding of the law.
  5. In the final step of our argumentation, I will elucidate the implications of this dialectical understanding of One primary conclusion is that norms impede the progress of emancipation, potentially leading to an impasse in the psychoanalytical process.
  As we assert the importance of law over the imaginary pluralism of norms, we must exercise caution not to fall into the trap of upholding the status quo. Hence, it becomes crucial to integrate the concept of law with that of emancipation. These challenges present a significant test for psychoanalysis, and I will argue that a distinctive perspective within psychoanalysis can aid in addressing this challenge—a perspective I shall refer to as dialectical psychoanalysis. The initial issue we must tackle is the problem of the ideal, its inherent contradictions, and the question of why ideals continue to hold such allure.   The Ideal and How It Seduces An ideal can be defined as an idea that serves as a model for the subject to emulate, something the subject aspires to but never fully attains. “Ideals are models of excellence” (Rosati, 2010, p. 435). Within the concept of ideals, two distinct aspects can be discerned: the first aspect is perfection and its “should-being” and the second is the imperfection of “not- being.” These aspects are typically distributed in a specific manner. Ideals often embody the characteristics of perfection and excellence, while the subject usually grapples with the aspect of imperfection and lack. In the first aspect, we can observe a structural similarity to the norm. Both ideals and norms are ideas that serve as criteria for the subject. The subject strives to meet these criteria, and ideals and norms together form a scale for evaluating the subject. However, the subject can never fully meet these expectations. If an ideal is reached and its content is realized, the ideal loses its influence and dissipates. There must be a gap, a continuous degree of difference, to sustain the power of the ideal. The first aspect, involving perfection and its “should-being”, can also be described from a psychoanalytical perspective. In the relationship between the imperfect, fragmented, and barred subject and the other, the subject constructs the phantasma of perfection and wholeness. In this framework, the ideal gives rise to an imaginary register rooted in the mirror stage. This type of ideal, known as the ideal ego, is founded on the imaginary relationship within the duality of subject and other. It’s at this point that the ideal exerts its seduction because, in the imaginary register, individuals desire to remain in this narcissistic realm. We understand the subject not as the res cogitans or the subject of reflexivity, but rather as the subject of the unconscious, that is, the divided subject, simultaneously separated and determined by processes that are inaccessible to it. The subject is thus not the unit that thinks of itself, that is self-aware, but rather the constant being-crossed of this unity. The aspect of imperfection, or “not-being” on the other hand, leads the subject toward a more symbolic type of ideal. When the ideals are not reached, a third position suddenly emerges, a position that assesses whether the subject has achieved its endeavours. Within this relationship, a symbolic dimension takes shape, represented by the great Other, who judges whether the subject has met the ideal or not. In this framework, the subject moves beyond the imaginary register. This is what Lacan refers to as the ego ideal. A key distinguishing feature between the imaginary form of the ideal ego and the symbolic form of the ego ideal lies in the concept of imperfection and negation. Of course, these processes take place on all three levels: the conscious, the preconscious, and the unconscious. Consequently, the two aspects of “should-being” and “not-being” give rise to the two facets of ideals: the ideal ego on one side and the ego ideal on the other. From the relationship of the subject to its ideals, two different dimensions emerge: One narcissistic- jubilatory dimension establishes the imaginary form of the ideal ego, while the dimension marked by lack constructs a symbolic ego ideal. To illustrate the difference between the concept of the ideal ego and the ego ideal, we can examine the notion of the judgment of God. In Wagner's opera Lohengrin, the accusation against Elsa leads to a divine judgment, where Friedrich von Telramund confronts Lohengrin. The outcome of this duel is accepted by all as a decree of a third party, not a result of the relationship between the two combatants. Everyone embraces this judgment, except for Ortrud, Friedrich's wife. She interprets the duel's outcome as a relationship solely and exclusively between Friedrich and Lohengrin, which leads her to question: “[W]ould you call your cowardice God?” (Wagner, 2011, p. 65). The origin of the ideal reveals an enduring element of seduction at its core, one that consistently exerts an influence on the subject. According to Freud, the Ichideal supplants narcissism, connecting the imaginary aspect of the ideal with feelings of grandeur and perfection:

This ideal ego is now the target of the self-love which was enjoyed in childhood by the actual ego. The subject's narcissism makes its appearance displaced on to this new ideal ego, which, like the infantile ego, finds itself possessed of every perfection that is of value. … What he projects before him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was his own ideal. (Freud, 1914, p. 94)

In the next phase, we need to connect these facets of the ideal with the concepts of norms and law. The ideal could serve as an explanation for why the subject should adhere to the instructions of the other, why the subject should obey.   From Law to Norm In the first step, we have observed how the concept of the ideal can be divided into two distinct aspects. This division becomes necessary due to the contradictory nature of the ideal, as it allows the individual to engage in the megalomania of childhood while simultaneously submitting to the authority of the symbolic Other. However, ideals are not solely significant in the context of an individual's relationship with themselves, in their self- reflexivity; they also serve a vital role in shaping society and maintaining its cohesion. “Most centrally, ideals serve to justify ethical judgments and to guide people in how to live” (Rosati, 2010, p. 435). Therefore, it is essential and justified to contemplate their relationship with law and norms. At this juncture, the insights of Michel Foucault are pivotal for our argumentation. One of his theses suggests that norms have gained increasing importance in modern Western society. In his work History of Sexuality Foucault establishes a distinction between norms and laws. He notes that laws “once directed people to do things through an exclusionary logic,” while norms “constitute standards against which people are measured incessantly” (Kelly, 2019, p. 9). Foucault claims two significant historical shifts in Western society. The first shift transformed the power structure from a form of sovereignty into a new form of power he terms disciplinary power. The second shift evolved the disciplinary framework into what he referred to as bio-politics (Möller, 2008, pp. 2770f). Particularly, the  first transformation, from sovereignty to disciplinary power, holds significant relevance for the continuity of this argument. The main characteristic of sovereign power that must be highlighted is the connection between sovereignty and the matter of life and death. As Foucault (1978) notes, “For a long time, one of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power was the right to decide life and death” (p. 135). He further develops the difference between law and norm:

Another consequence of this development of bio-power was the growing importance assumed by the action of the norm, at the expense of the juridical system of the law. Law cannot help but be armed, and its arm, par excellence, is death; to those who transgress it, it replies, at least as a last resort, with that absolute menace. The law always refers to the sword. (Foucault, p. 144)

Conversely, Foucault defines norms as “regulatory and corrective mechanisms” with the role “of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility” (Foucault, 1978, p. 144). This shift from the threat of death to the act of distributing life represents a pivotal transformation. As a result, norms operate primarily on an imaginary level, establishing a relationship between the subject and a secondary position that does not assign names to the negative aspects and the symbolic Other as described above. The primary characteristic of law in Foucault’s perspective is the threat of death. Therefore, we can argue that law, as a rule, functions at a level that assumes a castration threat and a third position, a symbolic authority vested with the right to judge. Castration, as a negating, prohibitive action of a real actor—namely that of the real father in the Oedipus complex—establishes the law as something symbolic, as something that must not be transgressed, otherwise a punishment looms. The norm of disciplinary power operates on a level where the threat of castration does not have the same significance. In this respect, there is a connection with the fundamental condition of the post-Oedipal society, in which the symbolic law also loses importance. The connection with the symbolic ego ideal is obvious: In terms of the ideal ego, the Other judges whether the subject has achieved its model or goal, but in terms of law, the Other judges whether the subject has crossed the line. Two opposing positions emerge: the standpoint of law and the standpoint of a pluralism of norms. However, from a psychoanalytical perspective, grappling with the concept of norms presents an unresolved challenge. It’s essential to recognize that Foucault’s theses on norms are intertwined with his criticism of psychoanalysis as a whole, particularly in relation to the idea of repression. Consequently, the notion of the neurotic symptom necessitates re-evaluation when the thesis of “norm” is accepted. This is the very historical context in which psychoanalysis finds itself today. Therefore, it is challenging for psychoanalysis to grapple with the body of work produced by Michel Foucault. The psychoanalytic community finds itself in a fundamental contradiction: On the one hand, there has been a societal shift in which the significance of the law has significantly decreased, and norms for the constitution of the ideal ego have become fundamental. On the other hand, many concepts in psychoanalysis, such as the unconscious, repression, etc., are tied to the theoretical validity of the law. Therefore, the psychoanalytical community is compelled to work within the clinical context of norms, even though some core concepts are rooted in the notion of law. Hence, a decision looms: Should we adhere to the concept of law, or should we, as certain segments of psychoanalysis have suggested, relinquish this “ancient” idea and embrace the new pluralism of norms? There is also criticism of Foucault’s concept of law, citing its “unjustifiable binary between sovereignty/law versus discipline/norm” (Walby, 2007, p. 554). The argument suggests that this binary framework fails to acknowledge the diversity of law. In my view, the issue with this critique lies in its conflation of symbolic law, which operates on an ontological level, with its positive forms found on an ontic level. There is a distinction between the symbolic law, which relates to Freud’s Urgesetz, and positive law (Tholen, 2012). We have seen how Foucault's distinction between sovereignty and disciplinary power can be integrated into the psychoanalytic idea of a transition from an Oedipal to a post- Oedipal society. At the core of this is the question of establishing a symbolic law and the imposition of a form of castration threat. At this point, we can approach the question of authority: Why do we obey? In a society with laws, what motivates us to respect those laws? If the threat of castration were to remain merely the threat of an external authority, we would not be able to understand this phenomenon adequately. The response to this question is far from straightforward and delves into fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis. The law, or put differently, the cultural and legal foundations of society, represent one facet of the neurotic conflict. While this might seem self-evident, it’s crucial to give due consideration to this point. In the original, orthodox formulation of the neurotic conflict, we have the libidinous drive on one side and the cultural and ethical constraints on the other. The drive seeks realization, yet it encounters societal limitations, which constituted the primary idea behind neurotic etiology. In its initial form, the law takes on the shape of negation. It is not defined by content but by the resounding “No,” famously known as the “No of the father." However, at this juncture, two problems come to the forefront:
  1. The first problem revolves around the question of why the subject should heed this “No.” This status can be established in two ways: through fear or through the ideal ego and its narcissistic nature (Freud, 1914).
  2. The second problem pertains to how a positive law emerges from its initial negative form. How does the “No” transform itself into a “Yes, I will do,”—effectively, the interpellation the subject (Althusser, 2014, p. 191).
  In my perspective, Freud attempts to address these two problems through the narrative of the primal horde.   The Subject between Norm and Law The next question we must find an answer to is how law and norms are established in relation to the subject. According to Freud, there are two fundamental elements that bind a community together: the force of violence and identification (Freud, 1933). This is a remarkable observation, especially when we consider the Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci’s characterization of the political dimension of society as a “hegemony protected by the armor of coercion” (Gramsci, 2007, p. 75). While coercion is primarily associated with a “No”, fear, and ultimately the threat of death, hegemony and, from Freud’s perspective, identification, pose a greater puzzle. Žižek describes these two positions as follows:

Today, however, is the very symbolic function of the father which is increasingly undermined – that is, which is losing its performative efficiency; for that reason, a father is no longer perceived as one’s Ego Ideal, the (more or less failed, inadequate) bearer of symbolic authority, but as one’s ideal ego, imaginary competitor. (2000, p. 334)

How is the subject confronted with these two aspects? It is useful to examine the logical positions with which the subject must contend. I will describe these relationships as a sort of logical square, representing the interplay of law and norms. [caption id="attachment_3720" align="aligncenter" width="300"]Square of Law and Norm Figure 1: Square of Law and Norm[/caption] In this square, the subject (S) is initially confronted with the other in both its imaginary dimension (a) and its symbolic aspects (A). This relationship to the other gives rise to two distinct positions, in a dynamic that supplants narcissism: one is the ideal ego (i(a)), and the other is the ego ideal (I(A)), a distinction that Lacan has explored on several occasions. From my perspective, the imaginary ideal ego corresponds to the position of the norm, while the ego ideal, in contrast, corresponds to the position of the law. Because, as we have seen, the law corresponds to a symbolic dimension that is simultaneously linked to a symbolic form of the ego ideal. This connection is grounded in the negativity of both the law and the characteristic of the ideal as deficient and imperfect. Let’s delve into a closer examination of the mechanisms by which norms and the law are established. Several steps are required to establish these positions:
  1. Initially, the other appears as the mirror of the The ego is constructed during the mirror stage, where the other is perceived as something equivalent to oneself (Lacan, 2006a).
  2. It is only through symbolic castration, which results from the process of being alienated from this imaginary level due to the chain of signifiers, that the subject can assume a position in which it can accept the Other as a symbolic entity.
  3. Narcissism is not relinquished without cause. It must be replaced with something other, but this replacement depends on the form in which this takes Freud’s ideal ego is in some respect the answer to the decline of narcissism. In the imaginary register, it is replaced with the ideal ego, in the symbolic register, it is replaced with the ego ideal.
  4. These two positions are not alternative states; instead, the subject must grapple with both the ideal ego and the ego ideal concurrently. To a certain extent, the individuality of the subject emerges as a result of the unique configuration of these positions and their dynamics.
  The primary question revolves around why narcissism is sometimes replaced more by the ideal ego in certain cases and by the ego ideal in others. This question can be approached from both clinical and socio-philosophical perspectives. From a clinical standpoint, it examines individual variations in this replacement process. From a socio- philosophical perspective, it delves into why the dominant mechanism of post-Oedipal capitalism relies more on the concept of norm rather than the mechanism of law. Žižek argues similarly, although he employs the term “norm” in a different context or sense:

This disintegration of paternal authority has two facets. On the one hand, symbolic prohibitive norms are increasingly replaced by imaginary ideals (of social success, of bodily fitness…); on the other, the lack of symbolic prohibition is supplemented by the re-emergence of ferocious superego figures. (Žižek, 2000, p. 368)

The square of law and norm provides insights into how the subject can manage its relationship with the other. The symbolic solution is represented by the law, while the imaginary solution is encapsulated by the norm. The demarcation between narcissism and the symbolic relationship with the “other” is established by the intricate process of symbolic castration. Therefore, it is unsurprising that we would uncover the answers within this domain. At this juncture, it's essential to revisit Lacan's notion of the castration complex and its connection to the concept of a post-Oedipal society. Lacan (2020) delineates three key moments within the castration complex):
  1. In the first moment, the child desires to be the imaginary phallus of the mother, aiming to become the object of the other’s desire.
  2. In the second stage, the imaginary father emerges in the mother’s discourse. He enforces the law, particularly the incest taboo, necessitating the separation of the child, as the imaginary phallus, from the Thus, the law is imposed within the discourse of the other.
  3. In the third moment, the real father intervenes, finalizing the process of At this point, the father demonstrates his possession of the imaginary phallus, compelling the child to relinquish the notion that he or she is the phallus.
  Indeed, these moments in the castration complex are crucial for comprehending the process of subject formation within the framework of the Oedipal structure. Lacan’s perspective emphasizes that these moments are not necessarily stages in a linear developmental sense. Instead, they represent distinct logical positions that can manifest simultaneously, reflecting the complex interplay of desire, identity, and the law within the subject’s psyche. This nuanced understanding underscores the intricacy of human subjectivity and the interrelations of these elements in the formation of the self. The issue of castration could be also formulated as follows (Lacan, 1998):
  1. Every subject is castrated.
  2. There is one subject, who remains uncastrated, and that is the primordial father.
  In the symbolic register, the subject has accepted the law of the father, whereas in the imaginary register, the subject is identified with an imaginary father and therefore aspires to emulate the father. In the realm of the imaginary, there’s still a potential to be the one who is uncastrated. The subject’s positioning concerning castration influences the formation of the ideal ego and ego ideal. To be more precise: the norm often tends to deny castration. The concept of a post-Oedipal society does not imply that the subject itself is confined to the first moment of the castration complex and does not progress through the other moments. All three moments of the castration complex retain their importance for the subject. However, on a secondary level, within the context of society, the first moment, the phallic- imaginary moment, acquires a new significance. In a manner akin to Hegel's idea of “mediated immediacy,” we can describe this new status as a “mediated phallic-imaginary moment.” The castration enacted by the real father is complete, so it becomes an inherent part of this moment, unless the subject’s orientation undergoes a change. Therefore, the post-Oedipal society is not characterized by the absence of the law, but rather its imaginative reinterpretation as a norm. This perspective acknowledges that while individual subjects may navigate all three moments of the castration complex, societal shifts and changes can place a distinct emphasis on one particular moment, such as the phallic-imaginary moment, within the broader cultural and social context. The two positions of law and norm can be described in greater detail. I will distinguish between law and norm using three axes:
law norm
subjugation reaching
universality individuality
prohibiting productive
The first distinction concerns that between subjugation and reaching. Law should be described as a force that leads the subject into a state of subjugation. Subjugation, in this context, means an act of controlling and ruling someone. Nevertheless, it doesn’t solely involve obeying someone, but it represents the pivotal point in becoming a subject (Butler, 1997). Castration is not merely an event that the subject has to grapple with; it serves as the prerequisite for becoming a subject. From my perspective, subjugation under the law implies accepting castration, recognizing the inherent defect and lack within the subject. In this light, on a clinical level, the goal of psychoanalysis could be to facilitate the acceptance of the law of symbolic castration. In contrast, the norm is not about subjugating the subject, but rather about achieving a goal. So, the process of reaching a goal is characteristic for the norm. On the second axis are universality and individuality, respectively. The law in its symbolic form asserts its universality. It holds validity beyond the subject. The norm tends towards a kind of imaginary negotiation between the subject and the other. While the norm dictates universal contents, the individual process of reaching the norm appears to be crucial. The third axis concerns the question of the negativity of law and norm. The law has a prohibitive character, initiating a process of negation. On the other hand, the norm is characterized by its positive nature, in that it provides goals to be achieved. In the production of something, the subject endeavours to adhere to the norms. This characteristic brings us to a crucial point that we must consider as essential: the law acknowledges its negative component, or more precisely, its negativity. It’s the presence of this negativity that allows the law to establish a symbolic character. Norms, on the other hand, fail to acknowledge this negativity and often remain confined to the realm of the imaginary. Without negativity and its dialectical dynamic, narcissism is merely confronted and challenged by norms. It is only through prohibition, the “No of the father,” that the subject is truly confronted with its negative aspects. This is a pivotal point in the progression of the argument: Without negativity and the absence of a dialectical movement, the subject remains ensnared within the confines of the imaginary realm. Therefore, we must address the question: What does the dialectic signify for the law? In some respects, it becomes apparent that the law can encompass both dimensions—force and identification, coercion and hegemony. Conversely, norms tend to negate the dimension of coercion and the “No of the father”.   The Dialectic of Law  Describing the logical positions of law and norm is only the initial step towards comprehending their dynamics. It is imperative to take into account the movement of these positions and their negation. One way to elucidate this movement is through Hegel’s dialectic of master (or lord) and slave (or bondsman). The aspect of sovereignty underscores the significance of the question of life and death. This aspect is intricately linked to the dialectic of lordship and bondage, or more precisely, master and slave, as Hegel’s argumentation starts with their struggle for life or death. This dialectic imparts a unique structure to the logical positions of law and norm, and within this framework, we can delineate specific phases of this movement. In the context of the post-Oedipal society, this dialectic is increasingly overlooked and perhaps even denied. Nevertheless, for psychoanalysis, the dialectic of master and slave retains its significance because it’s integral to its subversive nature. The psychoanalytical framework may appear outdated or unmodern in some respects because it continues to be a space where the law is acknowledged and explored. It can be described as a particular task of psychoanalysis to offer the law within the context of a society governed by norms. In a society that tends to prioritize and uphold norms, psychoanalysis provides a unique space for exploring the role of the law, prohibitions, and the dialectical dynamics that underpin human subjectivity and development. We can also understand this transition from the Oedipal to the post-Oedipal society as a transition from the master’s discourse to the university discourse. In this regard, an interesting constellation arises, as Lacan described the master’s discourse as the other side of psychoanalysis. Only the analyst’s discourse would be an actual counterpoint to this discourse, yet at the same time, it is subsumed within it (Lacan, 2007). The shift of society towards a discourse of the university not only challenges the discourse of the master but also its other side, namely psychoanalysis. Regarding the master’s discourse, Hegel’s notion of self-consciousness is significant for understanding the dynamics of human subjectivity, relationships, and societal development. In the realm of self-consciousness, the subject exists in a sort of secondary narcissistic state. One prerequisite for self-consciousness is the mutual recognition of at least two self-conscious entities.

Self-consciousness is, to begin with, simple being-for-self, self-equal through the exclusion from itself of everything else. For it, its essence and absolute object is ‘I’; and in this immediacy, or in this [mere] being, of its being-for-self, it is an individual. (Hegel, 1977, p. 113)

The fundamental contradiction in this situation arises from the nature of self- consciousness. On one hand, the awareness of one’s self-existence implies the negation of the other, thus leading to the absolute negation of all others. However, on the other hand, it necessitates the other for self-recognition as self-consciousness. Within this narcissistic moment of self-consciousness, there also lies a dual sense of recognition. This recognition by the other is characterized by an inherent asymmetry because there is active recognition on one side and passive being recognized on the other. This dichotomy serves as the starting point for the dynamic between these two positions. Within this dialectic, the first phantasma emerges: the phantasma of the slave becoming the master and the phantasma of the master attaining independence. The pivotal and ironic turning point of this movement is that the truth of the master is being a slave, and the truth of the slave is attaining independence. The master cannot achieve true independence due to their dependence on the labour of the slave. In contrast, the slave has the potential to attain genuine independence through their work and constructive efforts. This dialectical process reveals the complex interplay of power and dependence, where the roles of master and slave are not fixed and can undergo transformation. Now, we must consider the elements of the ideal, law, and norm. Law, in this interpretation, offers a framework where the transition from the slave becoming independent can occur. The prohibitive nature of the law and its negative quality of “should-not-being” are the primary reasons why law functions on a symbolic level. It is at this symbolic level that the dialectic of master and slave can unfold. Law holds the potential for a unique form of mutual recognition that transcends the narcissistic state of self-consciousness. The self- consciousness of the real master is revealed as dependent, while the self-consciousness of the slave, conversely, assumes the status of real independence. On the other hand, the imaginary realm of norms does not provide the same structural support. The aspirational nature of norms lends itself to the phantasma of the slave becoming a master. In this context, the non-acceptance of being a slave becomes the primary impediment to achieving genuine independence. Norms, by their very nature, often lack the prohibitive and negative qualities that propel individuals toward a true transformation of their status. The dialectic of master and slave can be reinterpreted through a different understanding, one that aligns with the process of introjection, specifically in the context of Freud’s (1913) theory of the primal horde, the company of brothers, and paternal authority. In Freud’s conception, the company of brothers leads to the downfall of the primal father, a situation akin to the life-and-death struggle in the dialectic of master and slave. However, Freud’s ironic twist lies in the introjection of the father. This results in what Freud termed “deferred obedience” (p. 143), a process that establishes a new order. So, we can reframe the issue within the context of the narrative of a primal horde. Law provides the potential for a process of introjection, and hence, the phenomenon of deferred obedience. Conversely, norms serve as references that deny the position of the slave and, paradoxically, impede the process of introjection and its symbolic processing. Therefore, the dialectic of master and slave can be comprehended as an interplay between law and emancipation. There is an inherently cyclical movement that involves the struggle against the father, his demise, and the establishment of the law (Butler, 1991). This dynamic illustrates the ongoing tension between authority, resistance, and the reconfiguration of power within society. The central issue with the concept of the ideal is its inclination to seek a state of perfection. The perfection of the other becomes associated with the perfection of the subject itself, anchoring us in the realm of the imaginary. This pursuit of perfection can result in a setback, returning the subject to the position of a slave. To differentiate between the imaginary form of the ideal and its symbolic form, it’s imperative to consider one crucial element: the cannibalistic act of consuming the father. This act symbolizes a transformative process, marking a transition from the imaginary pursuit of an ideal to a symbolic understanding of the ideal that is no longer focused on perfection but instead incorporates the acceptance of the imperfections and limitations inherent in human existence. The paradoxical outcome of this movement is that there is no emancipation without law; law is the prerequisite for emancipation. Emancipation, as mentioned earlier, cannot be understood as the autonomy of the subject, as an independence from others. Rather, it is precisely a form of expanded scope of action that arises from recognizing these dependencies. There exists an ongoing dialectical process involving the establishment of the law as a response to narcissistic endeavours, but once the law of the father is established, it is continually contested and renewed. This dynamic reflects the intricate interplay between the need for structure and authority (law) and the constant challenge and transformation of that authority, all of which are central aspects of human development and societal evolution. The dialectic of master and slave provides a framework for understanding the psychoanalytical situation. In a Lacanian perspective, we can interpret transference as the point in the relationship of the elements where the acceptance of authority takes the form of “subject supposed to know.” Emancipation, within this viewpoint, encompasses both the liberation from the transference and the emancipation of the transference itself. It offers a temporary solution to the primary contradiction of the psychoanalytical situation: the simultaneous need for transference on one hand and the transcendence of transference on the other (Safouan, 2004). This dynamic captures the complex and evolving nature of the therapeutic process within psychoanalysis. In the context of the psychoanalytical situation with the analyst, when the confrontation with the other and the rejection of their authority occur, it can lead to a position in which the analyst remains in the role of a slave, accompanied by the associated phantasma of being a master. To explore these positions and their potential outcomes, we can depict this situation using a framework like the square of master and slave. This model can help us analyse the dynamics and power relations within the therapeutic relationship and how they evolve as the patient confronts and interacts with the analyst. While Lacan referred to the psychoanalytic discourse as a counterpoint to the discourse of the master, I believe that this proposed dialectical structure reflects aspects of the psychoanalytic situation. Under the conditions of a post-Oedipal situation, it may become clearer that the master’s discourse, and thus castration, moves closer to the analyst’s discourse. [caption id="attachment_3721" align="aligncenter" width="300"]Figure 2: Square of Master and Slave Figure 2: Square of Master and Slave[/caption] The square illustrates the two possibilities:
  1. The first option for the analysant is to undertake the work themselves and provide material for the In this laborious process, the patient assumes the position of a slave, but with the intention of using it as a steppingstone to overcome it. The outcome of this process is the emancipation from the transference, achieved through emancipation within the transference itself. The law emerges as the result of this process, manifesting as deferred obedience.
  2. The second option in this square involves the refusal of the analysant to accept the position of the Instead, the patient clings to the transference and is unable to progress beyond this stage. Within the phantasma of being a master, the analysant only regards the analyst’s directives, such as the rule of free association or the policy of neutrality, as norms. In this scenario, the path to emancipation for the subject remains obstructed.
  In this theoretical context, we can examine some clinical aspects to elucidate this thesis. Let’s summarize a few key points. In the neurotic phantasma in the psychoanalytic situation, there exists a complex where, despite being in the position of a slave, the subject desires to be a master. In traditional neurotic patients, they have the capacity to repress this complex and represent it in a phantasma. However, in the post-Oedipal context, this matrix has undergone a transformation. The post-Oedipal patient eliminates the “slave” component, fixating it in an imaginary normative register. Consequently, topics like the cancellation policy are discussed within the context of the imaginary register, rather than the symbolic realm. As a result of these structural changes, it becomes more challenging to engage in conversations and work through this issue. The crucial point is not whether the analysant is complaining about this policy or not, but rather the level at which they are addressing it, be it within the imaginary or symbolic framework. A key question that arises in the context of the cancellation policy is whether the rules governing the cancellation of a session are accepted as norms or as laws. If they are accepted as norms, it implies that their adherence is a result of the specific relationship between the analysant and the analyst. However, if they are accepted as laws, it suggests that they will be followed regardless of the nature of this relationship. This distinction reflects the dynamics of authority, compliance, and the symbolic framework within the psychoanalytical context. In some cases, there can be a structural resistance against the therapeutic process. The analysant may be actively engaged in the treatment, providing material and participating, yet the therapeutic progress appears to be impeded. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the patient rejects or resists the inherent dynamics of the master-slave dialectic. As a result, real emancipation may remain elusive because the patient is unable or unwilling to fully engage with the therapeutic process and confront the complexities of their own desires, resistances, and transferences.   Conclusion: Psychoanalysis of Law vs Psychoanalysis of Norm I assume that the question of law is one of the key issues for psychoanalysis today. In the post-Oedipal society, the castration complex may appear to diminish, but the consequence is not necessarily liberation from prohibitions; rather, it often results in an ongoing pursuit of norms. The contradictory nature of ideals highlights the distinction between norms on one hand and law on the other. Understanding the goals of law and norm and their dialectical dynamics is essential for comprehending the constitution of modern capitalist society and its liberal political system. Furthermore, these considerations have clinical implications that must be taken into account. The psychoanalytical framework, with its exploration of unconscious desires, transferences, and the dynamics of power and authority, is an important tool for addressing the complex interplay between law and norm within the individual and within society as a whole. Analyzing these dynamics can provide insights into the challenges and possibilities of psychotherapy and the broader socio-political context. Norm and law represent two different facets, two different ways in which the subject engages with the Other. In a broad sense, we can assert that ideals aid the subject in coping with the indignity of being subordinate. However, while the imaginary ideal ego tends to maintain the subject’s position as a slave, the law is the sole means by which the subject can achieve emancipation. The paradoxical outcome of these reflections is that law simultaneously acts as repression and a prerequisite for emancipation. The crucial element lies in its negativity and the dialectical movement it sets in motion. Law serves as a symbolic structure that imposes certain prohibitions and restrictions, which may initially be experienced as repressive. However, these restrictions create a space for the subject to engage with the Other, engage in a dialectical process, and ultimately gain a sense of identity and freedom. This dialectical movement is central to the psychoanalytical understanding of subjectivity and societal dynamics, emphasizing the complex interplay between law, transgression, and the path to emancipation. In my understanding, psychoanalysis is deeply informed by this perception of law and norm. In the history of psychoanalysis, there was a long-standing debate regarding whether there are Oedipal or anti-Oedipal approaches within the discipline. Today, there is a renewed question about how psychoanalysis is related to the issue of law. However, in contrast to the old debate, this renewed question offers a new way to connect it with the broader questions of negativity and emancipation. This ongoing exploration of the role of law within psychoanalysis underscores the evolving nature of the field and its continued relevance for understanding human subjectivity and society.

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Bio

Sebastian Baryli is a psychoanalyst in training and a teacher for children with social, emotional, and mental health needs. He studied history and political science, and he is a candidate at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Association (WAP). His research interests lie at the intersection of psychoanalysis, philosophy, and Marxism, with a particular focus on their structuralist and post-structuralist variations. [baryli@psychoanalyse.or.at]

Publication Date

September 20, 2024